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Abstract
This paper asks how well a general equilibrium agency cost model describes
the dynamic relationship between credit variables and the business cycle. A
Bayesian VAR is used to obtain probability intervals for empirical correla-
tions. The agency cost model is found to predict the leading, countercyclical
correlation of spreads with output when shocks arising from the credit market
contribute to output ﬂuctuations. The contribution of technology shocks is
held at conventional RBC levels. Sensitivity analysis shows that moderate
prior calibration uncertainty leads to signiﬁcant dispersion in predicted cor-
relations. Most predictive uncertainty arises from a single parameter.
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11 Introduction
The ﬁnancial health of a corporation can be gauged in part by its credit spread,
namely the cost of its borrowing in excess of a safe alternative. Credit spreads are
understood to be caused by agency costs that arise when borrowers and lenders
have asymmetric information. These costs may vary in intensity with the state
of the business cycle, linking macroeconomic and corporate risk. This link was
formalised in the dynamic general equilibrium agency cost model of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and is the main focus of the current
paper.
A stylised account of the mechanism working between macroeconomic risk and
credit spreads can be described as follows. Suppose a technology shock increases
the demand for capital goods. The entrepreneurs who supply new capital would like
to raise funds from households to ﬁnance increased production. Given information
asymmetries, the ﬁnancial contract takes the form of risky debt, a standard feature
of which is ﬁxed repayment to be made when solvent. When the entrepreneur is
bankrupt, the bond holder receives a fraction of the promised payment. The pos-
sibility of leaving lenders with the bill when bankrupt leads entrepreneurs to desire
excessive leverage, and intermediaries to demand a compensatory loan premium.
Macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in response to a shock are propagated by this mech-
anism, and the dynamics of real aggregates are made more consistent with data
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
Empirical studies show that macroeconomic risk is a signiﬁcant factor for spreads
in credit markets, see for example Gertler and Lown (1999) and Koopman and Lu-
cas (2005). The consensus ﬁnding is that credit spreads are negatively correlated
with deviations from trend output, and lead at the one year horizon, see Kwark
(2002). The present paper motivates these empirical observations using the theo-
retical macroeconomic model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). However, it is well
known that their setup has the implication that credit spreads widen following a pos-
itive technology shock, leading to a procyclical spread. For example, Gomes, Yaron,
and Zhang (2003) ﬁnd that the model is superior to the standard adjustment cost
approach in matching a number of asset pricing facts, but highlight its counterfac-
tual implications for the cyclical movement of spreads. In a related contribution,
Kwark (2002) introduces costs to adjusting investment decisions made in advance
2of a technology shock in order to match the pattern of observed comovements.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, I do not condition on tech-
nology shocks in deriving theoretical predictions for unconditional moments of data.
Using a plausible set of macroeconomic risk factors, the agency cost model predicts
the observed negative leading behaviour of credit spreads over the business cycle.
As in Li and Sarte (2003) and Cooper and Ejarque (2000), shocks may arise directly
from the ﬁnancial sector. These shocks are shown to be of central importance in
matching data. However, technology shocks remain the dominant source of out-
put ﬂuctuations, consistent with the real business cycle hypothesis, indicating that
previous rejections of the agency cost model may have been premature.
Second, the consequences of global parameter uncertainty is formalised using
reasonable priors for calibrated parameters as in Canova (1995), Geweke (1999a) and
DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman (1996). A signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty around
the point predictions is found under the baseline speciﬁcation. Local sensitivity
analysis identiﬁes the persistence of credit shocks as the principal source of this
uncertainty.
Third, credit and output data are modelled in a Bayesian framework, and proba-
bility distributions for both the theoretical model and the data model are calculated.
Estimated Bayesian probability intervals are consistent with previous ﬁndings of
negative, leading credit spreads. However, point estimates are subject to signiﬁcant
uncertainty in the case of the preferred measure of agency costs. In this paper, I
take the view that the theory is too stylised to directly describe observed data, mak-
ing estimation proceedures infeasible. Following DeJong et al. (1996) and Geweke
(1999a), the model is intended to match speciﬁed moments of the data only. Suc-
cess in this framework amounts to high overlap between the predictive and estimated
densities.
2 The model economy
This paper builds multiple sources of macroeconomic risk known to be useful for
matching theory to the data into the economy of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
There are four actors: households, ﬁrms, intermediaries and entrepreneurs. Firms
are fully owned by households, and intermediaries are passive vehicles for the per-
fect diversiﬁcation of idiosyncratic within-period risk. Household/ﬁrms operate in
3competitive markets to produce a ﬁnal consumption good using capital and labour
as inputs. Entrepreneurs are a separate class, with a diﬀerent preference struc-
ture and access to a diﬀerent technology, which transforms ﬁnal goods into capital
goods. There is an informational asymmetry between individual entrepreneurs and
household/intermediaries which creates incentive problems that are remedied by the
parties writing contracts that resemble standard debt. For further discussion, see
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
2.1 Households and ﬁrms
Households own capital which they rent to ﬁrms, earning rental payments r, and
supply labour, which earns a competitive wage w. Household preferences over con-
sumption c and fraction of hours worked h are given by a CES utility function with
discount factor β:
U(c,h) = E0
∞  
t=0
β
tat
(c
χ
t [1 − ht]1−χ)
1−σ − 1
1 − σ
(1)
where the preference shock a will be assumed to follow an autoregressive process.
The coeﬃcient σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and χ controls the substitutability of consumption and leisure in utility. Firms’
technology is given by:
yt = θtk
α
t h
1−α
t (2)
where k is physical capital and θ is an autoregressive shock to total factor produc-
tivity. We take the overall labour input to comprise that from households and a
quantitatively trivial contribution from entrepreneurs he with output elasticity αe.
This will be needed by entrepreneurs who have zero net worth, in order to partici-
pate in the ﬁnancial market. The cost of a unit of capital is q units of ﬁnal goods.
Because households are able to diversify away idiosyncratic risk via intermediaries,
capital goods are received with certainty. It follows that the household’s capital
purchases must satisfy the Euler equation:
qt = Etβ
 
at+1
at
  
ct+1
ct
 χ(1−σ)−1  
1 − ht+1
1 − ht
 (1−χ)(1−σ)
{(1 − δ)qt+1 + rt+1} (3)
where r is the rate of return on capital, and δ is the rate of depreciation. The ﬁnal
term on the right, in braces, is the total return (rental plus capital gain) to holding
a unit of capital from this period to the next.
4The labour supply decision is governed by the requirement that the returns to a
marginal hour devoted to market activity are equal to the return to devoting that
same hour to leisure:
1 − χ
χ
ct
1 − ht
= (1 − α)θtk
α
t h
−α
t . (4)
Notice that the preference shock acts symmetrically on the marginal utility of con-
sumption and leisure, a positive shock acting to increase the demand for both,
without altering the intra-temporal margin between them.
2.2 Entrepreneurs and intermediaries
Intermediaries take deposits from households and make intra-period loans to the
mass of entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur operates a production technology that
carries some idiosyncratic risk, so that for every i units of consumption goods that
are invested, ωi units of capital goods are produced, where the distribution function
of ω is denoted φ(ω), and Eωω = 1. The ﬁnancial contract is obtained under the
assumption of risk neutrality on the part of the contracting parties, as the loan is
within-period and there is no aggregate risk over its life. Expected entrepreneurial
revenue is maximised subject to an expected break-even condition for the intermedi-
aries. Entrepreneurs capture the surplus, with intermediaries as residual claimants.
Formally:
maxqtitf(̟t) subject to qtitgt(̟t) − (it − nt) ≥ 0 (5)
where i is total investment, n is net worth and:
f(̟t) =
  ∞
̟t
ωφ(ω)dω − [1 − Φ(̟t)]̟t (6)
and:
gt(̟t) =
  ̟t
0
ωφ(ω)dω − Φ(̟t) t + [1 − Φ(̟t)]̟t (7)
are the expected shares of the project revenue going to the entrepreneur and in-
termediary respectively. Here ̟ is the breakeven level of ω, the smallest value of
the idiosyncratic shock consistent with an entrepreneur being able to repay his loan.
The integral in (6) is the expectation of the idiosyncratic shock, conditional upon the
entrepreneur being solvent, multiplied by the probability of being solvent. Likewise,
the integral in (7) is the expectation of the shock conditional upon the entrepreneur
being bankrupt, times the probability that he is bankrupt. The fraction of output
5lost in bankruptcy is  , which is assumed to be an autocorrelated stochastic process
with mean  ∗. Innovations to   will be termed ‘credit shocks’. Variations in   can
be regarded as arising from shocks to intermediaries’ monitoring technology, with
 t >  ∗ being an adverse shock, in the sense that more product is destroyed during
the act of recovering the bankrupt ﬁrm’s assets (‘monitoring’).
The marginal addition to expected entrepreneurial revenue from an increase
in net worth is measured by the shadow price on the intermediary participation
constraint. From the ﬁrst order condition for investment, this marginal beneﬁt is
λt = qtf(̟t)/[1 − qtg(̟t)], which is seen to be the expected ‘return on internal
funds’, and is increasing in the price of capital. The optimal breakeven value ̟
satisﬁes:
qtitf
′(̟t) + λtqtitg
′(̟t) = 0, (8)
which upon substitution for the shadow price on net worth yields the eﬃciency
condition:
f
′(̟t) = −
qtf(̟t)
1 − qtg(̟t)
g
′(̟t) (9)
The expected reduction in entrepreneurial revenue from reallocating a marginal unit
of funds from internal to external should match the expected increase in intermedi-
aries’ revenue times the return on internal funds.
As the constraint on intermediaries’ expected proﬁts is binding, qig(̟) = i−n,
we can use the eﬃciency condition (9) to write the investment supply function:
it = −
ntf′(̟t)
qtf(̟t)g′(̟t)
=
nt
1 − qtg(̟t)
. (10)
As individual investment is linear in individual net worth, aggregate investment is
linear in aggregate net worth, and thus (noting in particular that g(̟) is a constant
with respect to ω):
It =
  ∞
0
itφ(ω)dω −
  ̟t
0
 tiφ(ω)dω = i[1 − Φ(̟t) t] (11)
Since some output of capital goods is destroyed by the monitoring process, expected
aggregate investment is less than the expected aggregate output of all entrepreneurs.
The aggregate law of motion for capital is thus:
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it[1 − Φ(̟t) t], (12)
6It is this investment ‘wedge’ that causes investment and consumption goods to diﬀer
in price. A reduction in bankruptcy costs   has a similar reduced form eﬀect to an
increased marginal eﬃciency of investment (Greenwood et al., 1988), a correspon-
dence that was also exploited in the context of credit market shocks by Cooper and
Ejarque (2000). In the current model, the risk attaching to credit shocks is time-
varying, with shock of given magnitude having more eﬀect when the probability of
bankruptcy Φ(̟t) is high. Households are insulated from the direct eﬀects of such
ﬂuctations, which here aﬀect only entrepreneurs and intermediaries. However, they
must bear the resultant ﬂuctuations in capital prices. Note that a standard real
business cycle model is a special case when agency costs shrink to zero.
It is optimal for the entrepreneur to put his entire net worth at stake, investing
all of his assets in the risky production process, since he is risk neutral and expected
returns are at least as great as the alternative. The entrepreneur’s net worth is given
by income earned from participating in the production of consumption goods we
the
t
and from the value this period of last periods undepreciated capital holdings zt plus
the rental income earned from capital this period. His net worth is therefore given
by:
nt = w
e
th
e
t + zt(rt + qt[1 − δ]); (13)
His income from production this period is expected to be qtitf(̟t). If the entrepre-
neur is solvent he makes a choice between consumption et and capital accumulation,
otherwise the terms of his contract give all output to the intermediary. His opti-
misation problem is now to maximise a linear utility function, which exhibits extra
‘impatience’ compared to households (an assumption which prevents the entrepre-
neur from becoming self-ﬁnancing):
U = E0
∞  
t=0
(βγ)
tet where γ ∈ (0,1)
subject to the budget constraint:
et + qtzt+1 = {w
e
t + zt(rt + qt[1 − δ])}
qtf(̟t)
1 − qtg(̟t)
(14)
where the last term is seen to be the return on internal funds. The resulting optimum
depends only on the relative payoﬀs of capital today versus capital tomorrow:
βγEt(rt+1 + qt+1[1 − δ])
qt+1f(̟t+1)
1 − qt+1g(̟t+1)
= qt. (15)
7The the expected market return and the expected return on internal funds must
therefore move reciprocally. Finally, entrepreneurs supply their entire time endow-
ment inelastically to market production. Bankrupt entrepreneurs carry zero capital
into the next period, and their net worth consists of the labour income they will
accrue during market activity.
3 Analysis
We will now quantify the predictions that the Carlstrom and Fuerst agency cost
model has for the credit cycle, and compare them to the data on the US economy
from 1961-2005. Three functions are examined that diagnose the descriptive capa-
bility of the agency cost model for the behaviour of credit in the cycle: the cross
correlation functions between the external funds premium and output, between cor-
porate leverage and output, and between the external funds premium and leverage.
3.1 Theory-based predictions
Our ﬁrst task is to ﬁnd distributions for the statistics of interest predicted by the
theoretical model. The procedure I follow is essentially the one recommended by
Canova (1995). Calibration uncertainty is represented by specifying independent
prior distributions over the parameters. I take 2,500 draws from the joint prior,
speciﬁed in Table 1; for each draw solve for the recursive equilibrium; calculate the
cross correlation function based on the resulting theoretical law of motion; ﬁnally,
apply a kernel smoothing algorithm to approximate the density function at each
point of the cross correlation function and ﬁnd quantiles.
Prior distributions must be assigned to ﬁfteen parameters, falling into two groups.
The ﬁrst group are those parameters standard in the RBC literature, which deter-
mine the income shares of labour and capital, the desireability of intertemporal
consumption smoothing, and so on. The second group comprises the additional
parameters required for the agency cost part of the model. Here, there is less di-
rect guidance from current simulation practice or from estimation studies, and so
indirect evidence is sought.
A great deal of attention in the business cycle literature has focussed on σ,
the coeﬃcient of household risk aversion, with a wide range of values entertained.
Households in our economy do not bear extra risk compared to a model with no
8Table 1: Prior distribution of parameters
Quantile
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
σ 1.147 1.240 1.317 1.394 1.473 1.564 1.675 1.828 2.0909
β 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.989 0.990 0.991 0.992 0.993 0.994
α 0.340 0.345 0.350 0.355 0.360 0.365 0.370 0.375 0.380
δ 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024
 ∗† 0.170 0.228 0.275 0.316 0.357 0.399 0.443 0.493 0.558
σω† 0.252 0.326 0.391 0.455 0.516 0.576 0.634 0.692 0.758
ρθ 0.915 0.925 0.933 0.940 0.946 0.953 0.959 0.967 0.978
ρa 0.862 0.877 0.887 0.896 0.903 0.911 0.919 0.928 0.941
ρ  0.933 0.940 0.945 0.949 0.954 0.958 0.962 0.967 0.974
σθ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
σa 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008
σ  0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.016
Note: Quantiles are estimated from simulated independent marginal prior distributions.
† Joint distribution is partially restricted by feasible range of γ.
agency problem, so a range of variation that reﬂects current practice in the literature
is chosen. Values at or close to unity are common, and values greater than three are
rare. The household discount rate β is pinned down to a narrow range by estimates
of the real interest rate. Not having a particular stand on what this number should
be, a ﬂat prior on a narrow range centered on a baseline value of 4% per annum is
chosen. The production function parameter α represents the share of income going
to all capital, public and private. I allow it to take values uniformly on the interval
[.335,.385]. The depreciation rate of installed capital δ has a mean of 8% per annum,
and may is uniform on an interval between 6 and 10%.
The parameter  ∗ is the mean fraction of assets destroyed by monitoring, or
the costs of bankruptcy, including indirect costs such as business reorganisation.
The variance of idiosyncratic risk is σ2
ω, and the steady state breakeven point ̟∗.
Together,  ∗, σω and Φ(̟∗) determine the steady state return on internal funds,
and its reciprocal the entrepreneurial discount factor γ. As γ < 1, an indirect
restriction is placed on their feasible range. To calibrate, take the density function
for entrepreneurial technology φ(ω) to be log-normal with mean one, so if we deﬁne
τ = log(1 + σ2
ω), then ω ∼ LN(−τ2/2,τ2). This information is translated into
9observables by noting that the premium on external ﬁnance is in the steady state
q∗(1+r∗)−1, and given  ∗, the price of capital q∗ is a function of ̟∗ and σω, via the
distribution function Φ(̟∗). For tractability, Φ(̟∗) will be ﬁxed so the quarterly
bankruptcy rate is 0.974%, whilst  ∗ and σω will be permitted to take values in a
range that keeps the return on internal funds positive (and thus γ < 1). Carlstrom
and Fuerst quote bounds for the cost of bankruptcy of between 20% and 36% of
assets, on the basis of a comparison of the value of the ﬁrm as a going concern with
its liquidation value. The implied ﬁnance premium ranges from 1.6% to 8% per
annum.
The persistence of the forcing processes ρθ, ρa and ρ  are known to be important
for model dynamics (see Canova, 1995 for evidence in the RBC setting), so some
care must be exercised in setting reasonable ranges of variation. This study adopts
values based on the direct estimates found in Ireland (2003) and DeJong et al.
(2000) (the latter being Bayesian estimates), for which estimated standard errors
are also available1. Technology shocks are estimated to be highly persistent AR(1)
processes, with an autoregressive coeﬃcient in a narrow range around ρθ = .95.
Evidence on the persistence of demand shocks from Ireland’s study is weaker, as he
reports subsample instabilities in its estimated value. Nevertheless, they are likely
to have been reasonably persistent over our sample period, and consequently I chose
ρa = .90. The persistence of credit market shocks may be established indirectly from
estimated investment shock processes, due to the correspondence between these and
credit market shocks in (12). Both studies estimate a value in the region of ρ  = .95,
with a small standard error of 1.6% in the case of DeJong et al., but with considerably
less accuracy in the case of Ireland.
Conditional volatilities of the forcing processes σθ, σa and σ  are set using indirect
evidence from variance decompositions. Li and Sarte (2003) ﬁnd the contribution of
credit shocks to the forecast variance decomposition of US manufacturing output to
be 18% after ten years. Ireland ﬁnds a wide range of possible shares for investment
shocks in the variance decomposition of aggregate output. Given this uncertainty, a
wide range of variation in σ  is allowed for. Under the baseline calibration, shocks
to credit markets account for roughly a ﬁfth of output variance, and technology
shocks account for roughly two thirds, fractionally below that claimed in the RBC
1Estimates are taken the ﬂexible price version of Ireland’s model. Additional shocks in his
model are seen to be quantitatively unimportant. I assume the consistency of his estimates.
10Table 2: Output variance decomposition bounds
Variance share
Parameter range tech demand credit σy
base - .68 .09 .24 .020
ρθ [.90, .99] [.53, .94] [.13, .02] [.35, .05] [.017, .046]
ρa [.84, .96] [.70, .64] [.06, .14] [.24, .22] [.020, .021]
ρ†
  [.90, .99] [.74, .43] [.09, .05] [.17, .52] [.020, .026]
σθ [.001, .005] [.31, .84] [.18, .04] [.51, .12] [.014, .028]
σa [.002, .008] [.73, .61] [.02, .18] [.25, .21] [.020, .022]
σ  [.007, .016] [.79, .57] [.10, .07] [.11, .36] [.019, .022]
† Upper tail truncated. The table shows the eﬀect of setting the named parameter at each bound,
whilst other parameters are held at the mid-points of their bounds. Totals may not sum to 1 due
to rounding. σµ scaled by 102.
literature. Household preference (‘demand’) shocks are set to account for residual
variability, making output volatility equal to that in our data sample, 2% per annum.
To verify that the priors on the forcing processes have reasonable implications,
Table 2 reports bounds for the decomposition of output variance, when persistence
and conditional volatility parameters are at the extremes of their range2. In all
cases, the share of output variation due to technology shocks remains within a range
that contains a consensus ﬁgure of 70%. Technology shocks dominate, and output
becomes excessively volatile, when their persistance is high. Output volatility is
otherwise reasonable. Demand shocks are never more than a ﬁfth of output variance,
and credit shocks are on average less than one quarter of output variance. The
predictive cross correlation distributions are therefore based on a set of empirically
supported priors that have sensible consequences for aggregate ﬂuctuations. Given
the modest deviation from the technology-driven business cycle assumption of used
in previous tests of the model, we will see below that the model delivers a much
improved description of commonly examined features of the data.
2It is necessary to rescale the estimated standard deviation of credit shocks by coeﬃcient Φ(̟)
which is approximately 102, due to the diﬀerent units attaching to the shock under the current
speciﬁcation.
113.2 Empirical analysis
In this section, estimation of empirical cross correlation functions for ouput growth,
leverage growth, credit spreads, and other macroeconomic variables is described. I
follow DeJong et al. (1996) and estimate a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR)
to derive probability intervals for these statistics. Denote by y = vec(yT
p+1) the
m(T −p) vector of observations from time p+ 1 through T. Then the pth order, m
dimensional VAR is written as:
y = ZβV + e where e|(βV,ΣV,Z) ∼ N(0,ΣV ⊗ IT−p)
Z = Im ⊗ [1 y
T−1
p y
T−2
p−1 ... y
T−p
1 ]
Priors: βV ∼ N(βV,H
−1
β ) H ∼ Wi(S
−1,ν) (16)
where βV is a m(1+mp)×1 vector of parameters and ΣV is an m×m inverse precision
matrix for the disturbance vector E = [ε1...εm]′. The prior mean β
V is set to zero
in all cases except the ﬁrst autocorrelation of output and leverage growth, which
is set to 0.8. Prior precision H is controlled using two hyperparameters, denoted
tightness w1 and symmetry w2. The former shrinks all elements of βV closer to
their prior mean, the latter leaves precision for the lagged dependent variable of an
equation unchanged, but symmetrically shrinks lags of other variables to their prior
mean. Precision also increases with lag length, geometrically weighting long lags to
be closer to their prior means. Prior precision S is assumed diagonal in squared OLS
regression standard errors from a third order autoregression. The density function
for cross correlations is constructed from the BVAR, subject to stationarity, by
drawing from the posterior using a Gibbs sampler, and using a kernel smoothing
algorithm to obtain an estimate. For details of the posterior sampling algorithm,
see Geweke (1999b).
The data is as follows. Aggregate output, consumption and investment are mea-
sured by the annual change in the logarithm of real GDP, non-durable consump-
tion plus services and private domestic investment respectively. Aggregate leverage
growth is the annual change in the logarithm of the ratio of ﬁnancial liabilities to
ﬁnancial assets taken from the Flow of Funds data. Financial liabilities include cor-
porate paper (short term debt issued by companies) and bank loans. This measure
tracks total liabilities closely. Financial assets include bank deposits, mortgages and
12the paper of other ﬁrms3. The majority of past studies use a corporate bond spread
to proxy the external ﬁnance premium. They diﬀer in whether the spread is taken
over T-Bills, a longer dated Treasury issue, or a safe corporate bond. I use two dif-
ferent spreads over a safe corporate issue, to avoid maturity mismatch and periods
of excessive volatility in T-Bill yields. The ﬁrst is a bond rated Baa by Moody’s,
which are in the middle category of investment grade bonds, described by them as
‘subject to moderate credit risk ... and may possess certain speculative character-
istics’. The second is a below investment grade, or ‘junk’, corporate bond. Gertler
and Lown (1999, p. 135) argue that this spread is likely to be ‘closely correlated
with the premium on external funds that...purely bank-dependent borrowers face’.
Although this measure is preferred, the relatively recent inception of the market for
high yield debt means that data is available only from 1980 onwards4. In the other
case observations run from 1961:4 through 2005:4.
4 Results
Table 3 compares mean cross correlation functions predicted from the agency cost
model with estimated quantities from observed data. The blocks contain information
on four diﬀerent cross correlation functions. In each case, expected values for the
theory-based prediction under the base prior and the technology-shock driven prior
are followed by empirical means using two alternative measures of the credit spread.
The ﬁrst row of Table 3 shows the multiple-shock version of the theory model
to predict a negative unconditional correlation between credit spreads and output
growth across the cycle. Spreads lead the output cycle with a mean correlation of
-.317 at one year, indicating that wide spreads are predicted to correlate with low
future output growth. The correlation function has a minimum of -.428, indicating
that strong current economic conditions are predicted to correlate with narrow cur-
rent borrowing spreads. For comparison, mean correlations under the technology
driven credit cycle hypothesis are also shown in Table 3. The mean prediction for
3Stationarity inducing transformations of the data are required for consistency with the theory
model. For both leverage and output, HP ﬁltering was tried as an alternative to diﬀerencing, in
order to capture the relevant ﬂuctations about trend. The resulting pattern of cross correlations
was similar throughout.
4Because of the short data sample, I experimented with tighter and more informative priors.
However, results were not sensitive within reasonable bounds.
13the credit spread is a positive correlation with economic growth at leads, with a
close to zero correlation at lags.
The picture for the multiple-shock theory model is similar to that seen in the
Baa-spread data, where the mean correlation is also negative, and also falls to a
trough around s = 1 at -.497. The junk spread has a stronger negative lead at
one year with a correlation of -.517, but is close to uncorrelated contemporaneously
and with lags of output. The ﬁnding of negative co-cyclicality is in line with the
estimates reported by Koopman and Lucas (2005).
Table 3: Cross correlations: mean credit cycle
spread/output
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Model (Base) -.317 -.324 -.335 -.360 -.428 -.280 -.214 -.186 -.171
Model (Tech) .316 .326 .334 .331 .304 .103 .029 .003 -.003
Data Baa-Aaa -.116 -.223 -.332 -.424 -.483 -.497 -.487 -.455 -.405
Data Junk-Aaa -.517 -.506 -.458 -.374 -.276 -.184 -.099 -.029 .021
leverage/output
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Model (Base) -.417 -.419 -.413 -.391 -.327 -.262 -.231 -.214 -.202
Model (Tech) -.730 -.758 -.786 -.816 -.846 -.891 -.864 -.813 -.755
Data Baa-Aaa -.110 -.196 -.222 -.194 -.145 -.099 -.061 -.032 -.013
Data Junk-Aaa -.168 -.267 -.280 -.211 -.125 -.064 -.021 .005 .016
spread/leverage
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Model (Base) .691 .725 .763 .812 .888 .930 .912 .891 .855
Model (Tech) -.401 -.412 -.392 -.290 .034 .040 .042 .039 .034
Data Baa-Aaa .021 .040 .067 .103 .145 .203 .207 .172 .136
Data Junk-Aaa .041 .076 .121 .168 .211 .195 .149 .095 .044
Note: Means of the theory-based predictive distribution under the base (multiple-shock) prior
(‘base’), the technology-driven prior (‘tech’) and the means of the posterior distribution implied
by a 4th order vector autoregression. See text for details. s < 0 leads; s > 0 lags; e.g. spread at
time t has theory-predicted correlation with output at time t − s of –.317 for s = −4.
The two dominant eﬀects underlying the pattern of comovements seen in the
theory-based predictions are technology and intermediation cost shocks. A positive
technology shock has the conventional eﬀect of increasing the demand for invest-
ment. Supply from entrepreneurs (10) is limited by a sharp rise in the cost of
14borrowing, as their net worth is predetermined. High capital prices increase their
return on internal funds, and thus their desire to accumulate capital and reduce
leverage. As investment supply shifts outward, capital prices and premia fall, and
the return on internal funds returns to normal levels. A positive demand shock
has the conventional eﬀect of causing substitution towards consumption and leisure,
reducing investment demand and the ﬁnance premium.
The eﬀects of a credit shock are as follows. When intermediation becomes more
expensive, the burden of extra cost falls on intermediaries themselves, as the contract
has them as residual claimants (5). If we think only of the intra-temporal problem for
a moment, ignoring the general equilibrium component of the model, we can identify
two eﬀects. First, the investment supply curve shifts outwards. Holding net worth
n and capital prices q constant, ∂i/∂  = qnΦ/(1 − qg)2 > 0. Second, the return on
internal funds is raised, as own net worth is relatively more valuable, and market
returns are lowered by (15). Entrepreneurs are induced to accumulate capital, which
causes their net worth to rise, reducing leverage. As every unit of resource put into
the investment good technology is now expected to yield fewer units of capital,
so the price of capital must rise to cover these costs. From the household side,
investment becomes less attractive relative to consumption. Households therefore
prefer to wait until agency costs fall before investing. A boom in consumption,
which reduces hours and so output follows. The immediate increase in credit premia
is reversed as entrepreneurial net worth increases, and agency costs are ameliorated.
The correlation pattern in the base model is more similar to that seen in the data
than that of the technology model because credit shocks raise default premia even
as investment demand falls. As a relatively small contribution from credit shocks is
required, negative diagnostics based on an assumption of technology-driven credit
cycles were overly pessimistic.
The cross correlation of leverage and output growth in the data shows a mild
negative leading relationship, stable and similar in mean across speciﬁcations, see
the second block of Table 3. High future output is therefore correlated with both a
narrow spread and low leverage this quarter. On aggregate, the value of ﬁrm bor-
rowing rises more slowly than the value of ﬁrm assets in the upswing of an economic
cycle, in spite of easier borrowing conditions. This hints that ﬁrms meet a good deal
of their short term investment needs from internal funds. Given that cashﬂows are
procyclical, demand for short-term ﬁnance is likely to be countercyclical. If ﬁrms
15mainly borrowed to ﬁnance higher future output, leverage would be a positive and
leading correlate with GDP. The agency cost model does predict that lower leverage
correlates with cyclical upswings, albeit more strongly than seen in the data.
The third block of Table 3 shows the correlation between spreads and aggregate
leverage. The base agency cost model predicts a strong positive correlation at all
leads and lags. In the agency cost view, wide spreads correlate with high leverage.
In the aggregate data, there is close to a zero correlation between leverage and
either measure of the spread. This ﬁnding suggests that agency costs are not the
sole source of aggregate risk driving credit spreads, and may not be the main one.
Table 4 shows mean correlations between consumption, investment and output for
comparison with other business cycle models. Notice that the demand shocks help
bring the mean cross correlations for macroeconomic variables closer to the mean of
the data.
Table 4: Cross correlations: Macroeconomic variables
consumption/output
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Model (Base) .494 .505 .510 .498 .442 .581 .642 .671 .686
Model (SD) .502 .517 .533 .553 .583 .609 .640 .669 .695
Model (Tech) .818 .847 .877 .906 .929 .913 .906 .900 .895
Data Baa-Aaa .221 .295 .386 .488 .596 .556 .443 .299 .186
investment/output
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Model (Base) .528 .555 .597 .674 .841 .608 .493 .426 .380
Model (SD) .727 .756 .784 .805 .806 .757 .696 .634 .575
Model (Tech) .809 .839 .869 .897 .916 .881 .828 .771 .715
Data Baa-Aaa .163 .272 .449 .628 .767 .607 .419 .246 .109
Note: Means of the theory-basedpredictive distribution from the multiple-shock prior (‘base’), from
the technology and demand-shock driven prior (supply and demand ‘SD’), from the technology-
driven prior (‘tech’); the mean of the posterior distribution implied by a 4th order vector autore-
gression using Baa-Aaa spread to measure the funds premium. See text for details; s < 0 leads;
s > 0 lags.
Figure 1 shows two dimensional contour plots of cross correlation probability
distributions. Contours represent probability quantiles of the distributions at 0.5,
2.5, 97.5 and 99.5%. For example, the 99% probability interval can be read oﬀ as the
16Figure 1: Probability intervals for cross correlation functions
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D1: Baa-spread data; D2: Junk-spread data; P1: base prior (multiple shocks); P2: technology
shock prior. Contours represent probability intervals at 99% and 95%; the central line is the mean.
These quantiles were obtained by simulation from the posterior distribution of each BVAR or from
theory predictive distributions. See the main text for details.
17area within the top and bottom contours. The central line traces the posterior mean
of the distributions. The ﬁgure has four rows: rows one and two (labeled D for data)
correspond to the empirical model using Baa data, and the model using Junk data.
In the Baa data, the correlation between the spread and output is less than zero with
at least 90% probability between s = −2 and s = 4. In the Junk data, probability
intervals are wider, and closer to the prior of uncorrelatedness, due to the shorter
data sample. For the remaining correlations, which are between identical variables
in each speciﬁcation but diﬀerent samples, the pictures are predictably similiar.
The third and fourth rows of Figure 1 gives distributions for the theory model.
There are two alternative priors. The ﬁrst is our baseline multiple shock model (P1),
and the second turns oﬀ both credit and demand shocks (P3), leaving a technology-
driven credit cycle. Demand shocks of the magnitude I consider have little relevance
for the credit cycle, although they are relevant for other business cycle moments
(Table 4). The baseline theory model has wide probability bands for the credit
spread-output correlation. The 90% probability interval runs from zero correlation
to a high negative correlation. The predictions of the technology driven model for
all correlations are concentrated in a narrower 99% probability interval than under
the base prior. In one sense, these predictions are therefore more robust to prior
uncertainty.
An informal judgement on the performance of the model under the baseline
multiple-shock prior (P1) relative to the technology-based prior (P2) can be reached
by assessing the overlap between their respective density functions, and those es-
timated using the BVAR. This is the basis of the diagnostic criterion proposed by
DeJong et al. (1996), and the formal odds ratio of Geweke (1999a). Agreement
between the multiple-shock model and Baa data on the credit-output cycle is high,
especially at leads. The leverage-ouput correlation also appears to show some over-
lap, in spite of its lower mean. A drawback of the technology-shock prior is that
high probability is often assigned to regions of the sample space that are assigned
a low probability by the data. That is, intervals overlap either very little, or are
narrow at points where the data is more diﬀuse. The spread-leverage correlation is
not well described under either prior, with little overlap in the probability intervals.
A prominent feature of the credit shock model (P1) compared to the technology
shock model (P2) is the wide probability interval seen particularly in the tails of the
cross correlation function. To determine which parameters are responsible for this
18dispersion, denote the cross covariance as function of the calibrated model parame-
ters γ(p). To gauge the sensitivity of γ(.) to p in the neighbourhood of the baseline
calibration, I compute the elasticity of the function with respect to each parameter.
Table 5 details these elasticities for the cross correlation between the premium on ex-
ternal ﬁnance and output, for one year lead and lag. The rows of Table 5 show that
Table 5: Sensitivity elasticities
Cross correlation between credit spread and output
s -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
σ -.388 -.393 -.388 -.356 -.285 -.256 -.229 -.215 -.210
β -2.44 -1.29 1.10 6.49 15.6 6.33 -1.37 -4.91 -5.96
α 1.06 1.12 1.20 1.34 1.53 1.38 1.26 1.21 1.21
δ -.003 -.022 -.047 -.084 -.134 -.097 -.071 -.065 -.067
 ∗ .818 .810 .794 .760 .711 .869 1.02 1.11 1.15
Φ .860 .855 .841 .818 .811 .992 1.20 1.33 1.39
σω 3.12 3.01 2.58 1.30 -1.25 -.193 .485 .752 .838
ρθ -6.64 -6.53 -6.44 -6.42 -6.54 -6.64 -6.73 -6.79 -6.83
ρa -.208 -.176 -.147 -.140 -.177 -.232 -.281 -.309 -0.322
ρ  27.3 26.0 23.2 16.9 6.10 22.6 37.8 46.3 50.3
σθ -1.01 -1.01 -.997 -.956 -.875 -.812 -.763 -.748 -.751
σa -.146 -.148 -.145 -.130 -.100 -.091 -.084 -.083 -.084
σ  1.15 1.16 1.14 1.09 .974 .902 .848 .831 .835
Rows give the sensitivity elasticity for the cross correlation of the credit spread at t with output
at t − s with respect to the named parameter. For example, a one percent increase in the CRRA
coeﬃcient σ would reduce Corr(sprt,yt+4) by 0.388 per cent.
the most informative parameters are those that control the unconditional variance of
the technology and intermediation cost processes, the household rate of time prefer-
ence and the capital share, followed by the parameters controlling idiosyncratic risk
and agency costs. The variance terms matter because they determine which shocks
dominate, on average, and therefore which pattern of comovements dominate, on
average. The discount factor matters because it a central determinant of the optimal
capital stock in the neoclassical growth model, and therefore variation in it shifts
the steady state up and down a concave production function. The correlations are
locally robust to variations in a majority of parameters, in particular some of the
harder to calibrate ﬁnance-related parameters such as the bankruptcy probability
19Φ. However, the main risk to the model’s predictions attaches to the tails of the
cross covariance function as ρ  varies, as locally its sensitivity elasticity is large.
5 Conclusion
This paper has assessed how well a macroeconomic model incorporating agency
costs describes the cyclical movement of credit spreads and corporate ﬁnancial data.
Previous research shows that macroeconomic risk is a signiﬁcant factor for credit
spreads, and new evidence from a Bayesian VAR supports the ﬁnding that spreads
lead the cycle with a negative correlation. It was shown that multiple plausible
sources of macro risk, including in particular shocks arising in the credit market,
improve the descriptive power of the model for unconditional correlations seen in
the data. Technology shocks remained the dominant source of output ﬂuctuations,
as in previous studies.
Not all aspects of the credit cycle were well described. In particular, spreads
appear close to uncorrelated with aggregate leverage in the data. Also, in focusing
upon the credit cycle, detailed consideration of other important aspects of the busi-
ness cycle were left aside. However, the model does predict positive cross correlations
between consumption, investment and output, as in the data.
The analysis in this paper points to some further issues that were not the fore-
most concerns of papers such as Canova (1995), which ﬁrst proposed the kind of
global sensitivity analysis performed here. It is nowadays routine to specify prior dis-
tributions for parameters of theoretical macroeconomic models as part of a Bayesian
estimation. For example, it is straightforward to check the predictive distribution
of moments required in estimation, and this could aid in diagnosing low marginal
likelihood values. Also, local sensitivity analysis may aid in the speciﬁcation of
priors by identifying the most important parameters. In particular, researchers of-
ten choose to ﬁx certain parameters and to estimate others. Presumably the data
will be most informative for those parameters with a high elasticity with respect to
moments used in estimation.
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22Appendices (Not for Publication)
A Linearisation
In order to obtain a numerical solution for the law of motion, I log-linearise around
the steady state. As a reminder, table 6 lists the variables. The full set of lin-
earised relations, deﬁning the constant Υ = αkα−1
∗ h1−α−αe
∗ as the steady state real
interest rate, follow (recall that entrepreneurs supply their entire time endowment
inelastically).
0 = −ˆ yt + ˆ θt + αˆ kt + (1 − α − αe)ˆ ht (17)
0 = −ˆ rt + ˆ θt + (1 − α − αe)ˆ ht − (1 − α)ˆ kt (18)
0 = R
d
∗(I∗ − n∗) ˆ R
d
t + I∗(R
d
∗ − ̟∗q∗)ˆ It − R
d
∗n∗ˆ nt − I∗̟∗q∗(ˆ ̟t + ˆ qt) (19)
0 = −c∗ˆ ct − e∗ˆ et − I∗ˆ It + y∗ˆ yt (20)
These are respectively the production function, deﬁnition of the capital rental rate,
deﬁnition of the premium on external funds, and the aggregate budget constraint.
The law of motion for aggregate capital is given by
k∗ˆ kt+1 = (1 − δ)k∗ˆ kt + I∗(1 − Φ(̟∗) ∗)ˆ It − I∗ φ(̟∗)̟∗ ˆ ̟t − I∗Φ(̟∗) ∗ˆ  t (21)
Notice that as   → 0 in (21), the expression collapses to the standard log-linear
accumulation equation. Notice also that this is similar to the Greenwood et al. (1988)
shock to the marginal eﬃciency of capital when agency costs are held constant.
The central Euler equations governing household and entrepreneurial capital
accumulation are
Etβ(q∗[1 − δ] + Υ){(χ[1 − σ] − 1)ˆ ct+1 + at+1}
− β(q∗[1 − δ] + Υ)(1 − χ)(1 − σ)
h∗
1 − h∗
ˆ ht+1 + βq∗(1 − δ)ˆ qt+1 + βΥˆ rt+1 =
q∗ˆ qt + β(q∗[1 − δ] + Υ){(χ[1 − σ] − 1)ˆ ct + at}
− β(q∗[1 − δ] + Υ)(1 − χ)(1 − σ)
h∗
1 − h∗
ˆ ht (22)
23Table 6: Model variables
Variable Description
y output
c household consumption
k aggregate capital
h household hours worked
q price of capital goods
I investment
r return on capital (equity)
Rd excess return on debt (external funds premium)
̟ break-even proﬁtability
e entrepreneurial consumption
n entrepreneurial net worth
z entrepreneurial capital
θ technology shock
a household preference shock
  intermediation cost shock
and
[βγ{q∗f(̟∗)(1 − δ) + [q∗(1 − δ) + Υ]f(̟∗)} + q∗g(̟∗)] ˆ qt+1
[βγ{q∗(1 − δ) + Υ}f
′(̟∗) + q∗g
′(̟∗)]̟∗ ˆ ̟t+1 + βγΥf(̟∗)ˆ rt+1
[1 − q∗g∗(̟∗)]ˆ bt+1 + Φ(̟∗) ∗ˆ  t+1 = [1 − q∗g(̟∗)]{ˆ qt +ˆ bt}. (23)
where b is a shock to entrepreneurial preferences not used in the main paper. These
Euler equations are the only places where the two preference shocks impact. The
shocks have the eﬀect of raising the demand for consumption and leisure, in the case
of the household, and of consumption rather than capital accumulation in the case
of the entrepreneur.
The eﬃciency condition for the ﬁnancing contract (or alternatively, the link
between bankruptcies in the capital goods sector and capital prices) is
0 = ˆ qt − q∗
  
φ(̟∗)
1 − Φ(̟∗)
 2
 ∗f(̟∗) +
φ(̟∗) ∗f′(̟∗)
1 − Φ(̟∗)
+
φ(̟∗) ∗f(̟∗)
1 − Φ(̟∗)
+  ∗φ(̟∗)
 
̟∗ ˆ ̟t − q∗
 
Φ(̟∗) ∗ +
φ(̟∗) ∗f(̟∗)
1 − Φ(̟∗)
 
ˆ  t. (24)
24Table 7: Timing assumptions
Stage Description
1 All aggregate shocks to preferences and technologies are realised.
2 Household and entrepreneurial labour supply decisions; ﬁrm capital
rental and hours decisions; production of consumption good.
3 If household wishes to add to its capital stock, it must give
consumption goods to the intermediary for investment in entrepreneurs’
capital good production technology.
4 Entrepreneurs invest all of their own funds plus borrowings in the
capital good technology; an idiosyncratic shock is realised, and each
entrepreneur observes his own output.
5 If solvent, the entrepreneur repays his loan; if bankrupt, the
intermediary captures the residual output after some fraction of the
investment is lost via monitoring.
6 Solvent entrepreneurs make their choice between consumption and
capital accumulation.
Notice that an implication of this expression is that as agency costs shrink (  → 0),
capital prices approach a constant, and steady state capital prices approach unity, in
which case the household Euler equation (22) collapses to the standard RBC Euler
equation.
Finally, the investment ‘supply curve’, the evolution of entrepreneurial net worth
and entrepreneurs’ budget constraint are respectively
0 = I∗[1 − q∗g(̟∗)]ˆ It − I∗q∗g(̟∗)ˆ qt − I∗q∗g
′(̟∗)̟∗ ˆ ̟t − n∗ˆ nt
+I∗q∗Φ(̟∗) ∗ˆ  t (25)
0 = −n∗ˆ nt + z∗(q∗[1 − δ] + Υ)ˆ zt + z∗q∗(1 − δ)ˆ qt + z∗Υˆ rt (26)
z∗q∗ˆ zt+1 = q∗(I∗f(̟∗) − z∗)ˆ qt + I∗q∗f(̟∗)ˆ It + I∗q∗f
′(̟∗)̟∗ ˆ ̟t − e∗ˆ et. (27)
To summarise, I have detailed the locally valid log-linear approximation to the
behavioural relations of the model which may be solved numerically, once values
have been assigned to parameters.
25B Analytic cross correlation functions
This section details a computationally simple method for calculating the cross cor-
relation function for the theory model. Traditionally, moment calculation was per-
formed by simulating a large data set using draws from the assumed model distrib-
ution. This is computationally expensive and introduces sampling variation which
we want to avoid when, for example, calculating numerical derivatives.
A solution to the model is a set of paths for the n endogenous variables y and
m states x that satisfy all behavioural relations and constraints for any realisation
of the k exogenous variables z, such that all markets clear. As the model is non-
linear, we study behaviour in the neighbourhood of the steady state. I use the MSV
procedure to obtain a law of motion of the form:
xt+1 = Pxt + Qzt (28)
yt = Mxt + Nzt (29)
zt+1 = Rzt + ǫt where Eǫt = 0 and Eǫtǫ
′
t = Σ. (30)
Once this law is in hand, any desired moments can be calculated analytically. The
log-linearised version of the model is given in Appendix A.
We start by rewriting the state space model (28)–(30) in VAR form, by stacking
the relevant matrices as follows:



yt
xt
zt


 =



0n×k MP MQ + NR
0m×n P Q
0k×n 0k×m R






yt−1
xt−1
zt−1


 +



N
0m×k
Ik


ǫt
If we deﬁne ξ, Λ and u in the obvious way, then we can write this as
(I − ΛL)ξt = ut where Euu
′ = Ω.
Inverting the polynomial in the lag operator and expanding yields the MA repre-
sentation
ξt = (I + ΛL + Λ
2L
2 + Λ
3L
3 + ...)ut.
This corresponds to the absolutely summable sequence of MA coeﬃcients given in
Hamilton (1994, §10.2) whereupon the sth autocovariance is
Γs =
∞  
v=0
Λ
s+vΩ(Λ
v)
′
26and the sth and s − 1th autocovariance are related by the simple recursion
Γs = ΛΓs−1,
with the relationship between leads and lags being
Γ−s = Γ
′
s.
Once we have calculated Γ0, it is therefore computationally cheap to obtain any
other autocovariance desired. Using the sparse matrix structure in Matlab saves
computer memory. I found that terms in ΛJ were numerically less than 1e-15 for
an expansion of J =1.5e3.
C BVAR setup
We brieﬂy describe the construction a model of an observed vector time series Yo
of dimension T × m using a BVAR. We will formulate the model as a special case
of the SUR model described in the BACC manual. The notation YT
τ will refer to
observations on Yo in rows τ up to T. The calligraphic script is to remind us that
this is observed sample data, rather than data simulated from our theory model.
We will henceforth consider the speciﬁcation of a VAR of dimension m and order
p. Deﬁne the T − p × 1 + mp matrix X as
X = [1 Y
T−1
p Y
T−2
p−1 ... Y
T−p
1 ] (31)
where 1 is a T −p vector of 1s. The m(T −p)×m(1+mp) matrix Z is then deﬁned
as
Z = Im ⊗ X (32)
=

 



X 0 ... 0
0 X ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 ... X

 



(33)
Finally, vectorise the data matrix, deﬁning Y = vec(YT
p+1). We may then write the
system as
Y = ZβV + E where E|(βV,ΣV,Z) ∼ N(0,ΣV ⊗ IT−p) (34)
27where βV is a m(1 + mp) × 1 vector of parameters and ΣV is an m × m inverse
precision matrix for the disturbance vector E = [ε1 ...εm]′. The posterior density
over βV and ΣV is calculated using the methods described in Geweke (1999b).
The empirical cross correlation function is calculated in the manner described
in Appendix 5.A, which requires only that the VAR(p) of order m be rewritten in
VAR(1) form. Supposing that
Yt = B1Yt−1 + B2Yt−2 + ... + BpYt−p + Et,
then the system in VAR(1) form becomes




 


Yt
Yt−1
. . .
Yt−p+2
Yt−p+1




 


=




 


B1 B2 ... Bp−1 Bp
Im 0 ... 0 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ... 0 0
0 ... Im 0




 






 


Yt−1
Yt−2
. . .
Yt−p+1
Yt−p




 


+




 


Et
0
. . .
0
0




 


Setting Λ to be the coeﬃcient matrix on the right of this equation, we may then
proceed as before, subject to the restriction that no root lies outside the unit circle.
Prior precision of variable j in equation i at lag l is given by:
S(i,j,l) =
w1g(l)f(i,j)si
sj
(35)
where w1 is overall tightness, g(l) is a scalar polynomial in l with geometric coef-
ﬁcients, f(i,i) = 1 and f(i,j) = w2 for i  = j and si is the inverse precision of an
autoregression in the ith variable.
D Data sources
Leverage - FRB Release Z1, March 2006, Table B102.
Junk bond spread - Salamon Smith Barney (Courtesy of Cara Lown).
Moody’s Aaa bond yield - Datastream.
Output, Consumption, Investment - BEA, 1st Quarter 2006.
28Figure 2: Data plots
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